Constitutional Law--Colleges and Universities--Denial of Recognition to Homosexual Group Abridges Freedom of Association--Gay Lib v. University of Missouri by McLeod, Richard Earl
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 43 
Issue 1 Winter 1978 Article 14 
Winter 1978 
Constitutional Law--Colleges and Universities--Denial of 
Recognition to Homosexual Group Abridges Freedom of 
Association--Gay Lib v. University of Missouri 
Richard Earl McLeod 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Earl McLeod, Constitutional Law--Colleges and Universities--Denial of Recognition to Homosexual 
Group Abridges Freedom of Association--Gay Lib v. University of Missouri , 43 MO. L. REV. (1978) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/14 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
RECENT CASES
change in 1975. The Rules Committee must have been aware of the
cases which deemed requests admitted without regard to the propriety
of their scope.2 4 Because the rule was not amended to say that only
proper requests may be deemed admitted in default of denial or objec-
tion, the Committee undoubtedly agreed with the result of the earlier
cases.
In light of the general unavailability of the Reporter's Notes, the
scarcity of Missouri case law on requests for admissions, and the fact that
Missouri often emulates the federal rules, the Linde decision is not sur-
prising. Until the issue of the proper scope of requests for admissions is
raised by an objection at the trial level to a request for the admission of





DENIAL OF RECOGNITION TO
HOMOSEXUAL GROUP ABRIDGES
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
Gay Lib v. University of Missouri I
In 1971, an organization calling itself Gay Lib was formed in Columbia,
Missouri, for the avowed purpose of providing a forum for the exchange of
ideas about homosexuality. 2 The group applied for recognition as a cam-
pus organization at the University of Missouri-Columbia in February of
1971. Benefits of recognition would have included access to university
facilities and the right to petition for funds from the student governing
body.
24. The Hudson, Kraehe, Manpower, and Zykan cases antedated the rule
change of 1975.
1. 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977),petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3268 (U.S.
Sept. 20, 1977) (No. 77-447).
2. The original statement of purpose of the group read, in part:The purpose of the organization Gayi Lib shall be:
(a) To provide a dialogue between the homosexual and
heterosexual members of the university community.(b) To dispel the lack of information and develop an under-
standing of the homosexual at the University of Missouri ....
Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 416 F. Supp. 1350, 1354 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
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After a committee of the student government initially approved the
petition to be recognized, the request was rejected by the Dean for Student
Affairs. Successive appeals were taken to the Chancellor of the Columbia
campus, the university President, and the Board of Curators. In each in-
stance the denial was affirmed. The decision of the Board of Curators was
based on a report from a Board-appointed attorney presiding at a formal
hearing held in August, 1973. 3 At the hearing, expert medical testimony
was offered by both sides of the dispute. The recommended findings of fact,
adopted by the Board of Curators, included the opinion that recognition of
the homosexual group would "tend to expand homosexual behavior which
will cause increased violations of section 563.230 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri" 4 (the sodomy law).5
Gay Lib and individual members brought suit in federal district court,'
alleging that their first amendment freedom of association was infringed by
the university's refusal to acknowledge them. The trial judge upheld the
right of the university to deny recognition. The Eighth Circuit reversed,
holding that the school had not shown an interest of sufficient import to
justify restriction of the group's constitutional rights.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 7 the Sup-
reme Court established the principle that students of state schools retain
their constitutional rights in dealing with the institutions.8 The Court noted
that nowhere is the protection of first amendment freedoms more vital than
in the schools. However, first amendment rights must be "applied in light of
the special characteristics of the school environment." 9 The state has a
significant interest in preserving disciplined and orderly educational proces-
ses. Therefore, courts will not intervene to resolve conflicts which arise in the
daily operation of state schools unless basic constitutional rights are impli-
cated.
Another established principle is that refusal to give official status to
campus groups can be an infringement on first amendment freedoms. 10 In
3. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1977).
4. Id. at 851 n.7.
5. The Supreme Court recently has upheld, without opinion, the constitution-
ality of a Virginia sodomy law much like Missouri's. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attor-
ney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
6. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 416 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
7. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8. "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506.
Although Tinker involved a municipal high school system, it generally has been
accepted as applicable to all levels of public education. See, e.g., Papish v. Board of
Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) ("indecent speech" rules on college campus); see
generally Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969).
9. 393 U.S. at 506.
10. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 416 F. Supp. 1350, 1368 (W.D. Mo. 1976); see
Note,Freedom of Political Association on the Campus: The Right to Official Recognition, 46
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1149 (1971).
[Vol. 43
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the seminal case of Healy v. James II a chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society was denied recognition by Central Connecticut State College. Al-
though the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for
determination of whether the college's action was constitutional, the Court
noted that "denial of official recognition, without justification, to college
organizations burdens or abridges ... [their] associational right." 12
The Eighth Circuit in Gay Lib considered the university's actions
analogous to a prior restraint on first amendment rights, traditionally disfa-
vored by the courts.1 3 A consistent line of cases has established that when a
prior restraint is sought to be imposed, the state bears a heavy burden of
showing the necessity of the restraint for the protection of a legitimate state
interest. 14 In Gay Lib the university relied on the somewhat novel tactic of
using expert medical opinion 15 to show the negative effects on the university
community of recognition of a homosexual group.1 6 The court of appeals,
however, said that "[e]ven accepting the opinions of defendants' experts at
face value, we find it insufficient to justify [the denial of recognition]." 17
Although the Supreme Court has said that only the likelihood of
"grave and irreparable damage" is sufficient to justify a prior restraint on
publication,1 8 the standard for justifying a prior restraint on associational
11. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
12. Id. at 181. The fact that the group still was free to meet and conduct activities
off campus did not "ameliorate significantly the disabilities imposed by the college's
action." Id. at 183; see also Mississippi Civil Liberties Union v. University of S. Miss.,
452 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1971).
13. The Supreme Court first announced this holding in Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931), but the principle is much older. Blackstone said, "The liberty of the
press is, indeed, essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no
previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal
matter when published." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS Or ENGLAND 151
(21st ed. 1858).
14. See also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (per-
formance of rock musical Hair prohibited in city theater); Baughman v. Freienmuth,
478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973) (principal of school required prior approval of
literature distributed by students).
15. The university's tactic is a logical extension of previous cases dealing with
similar matters. In McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809, 812 (D. Minn. 1970),
rev'd, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972), the trial judge
lamented that no medical or other expert witnesses were called to comment on the
habits or attitudes of homosexuals, and the court was "left with but the dictionary
definition of the term." In a case involving a homosexual teacher three years later,
extensive medical testimony was presented, but it only was sufficient to prompt the
judge to note that the danger the school feared was not "illusory." Acanfora v. Board
of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 849 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
16. The university marshalled experts with impressive credentials in the field of
the psychiatric study of homosexuality who indicated that recognizing Gay Lib would
in fact cause an increase in the number of criminal homosexual acts. 416 F. Supp. at
1368-69.
17. 558 F.2d at 855.
18. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 732 (1971).
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rights is unclear. The primary contention of the University of Missouri was
that recognition of Gay Lib would lead to increased violations of the Missouri
sodomy statute, and that prevention of such violations is a substantial state
interestjustifying prior restriction of constitutional freedoms. 19 This claim
was based on the "clear and present danger" cases, 2 ' which held that a
showing of imminent lawless activity could justify subsequent criminal liabil-
ity for otherwise constitutionally protected conduct. The currently accepted
restatement of this principle was expressed in Brandenburg v. Ohio: 21 con-
stitutionally safeguarded conduct may be punished when it is "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such actidn." 1 2
The trial judge in Gay Lib apparently accepted the university's argument
that the Brandenburg test also is appropriate to support a denial of recogni-
tion which affects associational rights. Citing Brandenburg, the trial court
found that recognition of the homosexual organization would "likely" lead
to violations of Missouri's felony sodomy statute, and that the university was
justified in refusing the requested recognition.2 3 The Eighth Circuit disa-
greed, concluding that "the restriction of First Amendment rights... may be
justified only by a far greater showing of the likelihood of imminent lawless
action than that presented here."2 4
The appeals court holding neither mandated the "grave and irrepara-
ble damage" standard nor expressly disapproved the more lenient "immi-
nent lawless action" test. Although several cases demonstrating insufficient
grounds for the imposition of a prior restraint were cited, 25 no clear indica-
tion was given of when prior restrictions on freedom of association will be
justified. It is obvious that the test is stringent and that instances in which a
19. An allusion to this proposition appeared in a recent Fourth Circuit opinion
involving similar circumstances. "If ... VCU's concern is with a possible rise in the
incidence of actual homosexual conduct between students, then a different problem
is presented. We have little doubt that the University could constitutionally regulate
such conduct.... But denial of registration is overkill." Gay Alliance of Students v.
Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 164 (4th Cir. 1976).
20. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (balancing gravity of the evil and
its probability of occurring against the interest of protecting first amendment free-
doms); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919) (in which Justice Holmes originated the "clear and present danger" test).
See generally Linde, Clear and Present Danger Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg
Concerto, 22 STAN. L. Rlv. 1163 (1970).
21. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Although the per curiam opinion did not mention the
clear and present danger test, Justices Black and Douglas disapproved it in concur-
ring opinions. Justice Douglas remarked, "Though I doubt if the 'clear and present
danger' test is congenial to the First Amendment in time of a declared war, I am
certain it is not reconcilable with the First Amendment in days of peace." Id. at 452.
22. Id. at 447.
23. 416 F. Supp. at 1369-70.
24. 558 F.2d at 854-55.
25. Id. at 855 nn.14, 15.
[Vol. 43
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 14
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss1/14
RECENT CASES
university may abridge the associational rights of students based on fear of
unlawful conduct will be rare.2
6
The court in Gay Lib noted that the trial court blurred the constitutional
line drawn inBrandenburg between mere advocacy and advocacy directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action.27 The district court made no
finding that Gay Lib intended to incite lawless action, or that their advocacy
was directed to that end. It would seem that the mere likelihood of unlawful
activity, as found in Gay Lib, is not sufficient to justify banning the activity.
The Brandenburg test also requires some showing of an intent to promote
such activities.
The second argument of the university was that recognition of Gay Lib
would lead to disruption of normal campus functions and the educational
process. Under Tinker, proof that recognition would "materially and sub-
stantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school" 2s would justify the university's action.21 The
Board of Curators had been presented evidence that such disruption might
occur when they rendered their decision denying recognition to Gay Lib.
Provisional recognition had been granted to the Gay People's Union on the
Kansas City Campus of the University of Missouri. Police officers testified at
the hearing that, following recognition of the group, homosexual activity
(including solicitation) increased markedly on the Kansas City campus,
resulting in numerous complaints from students and faculty.30 However,
the trialjudge excluded consideration of these issues as irrelevant to occurr-
ences at the Columbia campus. The university therefore was unable to make
the requisite showing.
Nevertheless, this approach provides the strongest basis for denying
recognition to homosexual organizations because it focuses on the substan-
tial state interest in orderly educational processes. The University of Mis-
souri might have met with more success if it had been able to establish that
26. In the only analogous case found in which a prior restraint was allowed, an
anti-war group wanted to use a campus building to hold a draft protest. Sellers v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 432 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981
(1971). Upon the advice of counsel thatyiolations of the Selective Service laws would
result, the administrators refused the group access to school grounds. The Regents
were upheld by the Ninth Circuit in a 2-1 decision with a strong dissenting opinion.
27. Id. at 856.
28. 393 U.S. at 505,quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,749 (5th Cir. 1966).
29. See, e.g., Augttstus v. School Bd., 507 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Rebel"
nickname prohibited in racially 1roubled high school); Norton v. Discipline Comm.,
419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 906 (1970) (prohibition of
distribution of pamphlets upheld); Merkey v. Board of Regents, 344 F. Supp. 1296
(N.D. Fla. 1972), vacated as moot, 493 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1974) (Yippie group advocat-
ing violence denied recognition). See generally Ladd, Allegedly Disruptive Student Be-
havior and the Legal Authority of School Officials, 19 J. PUB. L. 209 (1970).
30. Transcript of Hearing, Gay People's Union v. University of Missouri-
Kansas City (August 15, 1973) (Coil, Hearing Officer).
1978]
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the likelihood of imminent lawless activity alone threatened to disrupt the
school'environment within the meaning of Tinker.
It is important to note that recognition does not preclude the university
from regulating the conduct of Gay Lib. To the extent that the homosexual
organization's activities include use of public property, the university may
impose reasonable regulations on the time, place, and manner of the group's
activities. 31 Some decisions have suggested that the extent of permissible
regulation is related to the nature of the public property on which the activity
is to be conducted.3 2 For example, "street corner" demonstrations might
have to be allowed under conditions where similar conduct inside a univer-
sity building could be prohibited. Therefore, if the school could show that a
given organization was likely to violate reasonable restrictions on the uses of
particular buildings or facilities, it might be able to restrict the group's
activities to less sensitive areas of the campus.
The university administration may not regulate arbitrarily or dis-
criminatorily. 33 In Gay Students Organization v. Bonner 3 4 a college had rec-
ognized a homosexual organization and extended normal privileges to
them. After a widely publicized gay dance sponsored by the group, the
college administration attempted to ban such social affairs. The First Circuit
held that the restriction was not constitutionally permissible because it was
"content-related." 35 The state may not suppress the expression of views
merely because it finds them socially abhorrent.36
31. Sword v. Fox, 446 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir., cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971)(demonstrations not allowed inside campus buildings); Esteban v. Central Mo. St.
College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970) (partici-
pation in demonstrations in violation of administration directives).
32. "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemo-
rially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (per
curiam). See also Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968). Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (ordinance
prohibiting disturbance on public grounds adjacent to school upheld).
33. It should be observed that the message imparted is not totally irrelevant.
Where the speech or conduct is of such an inflammatory nature that disruptive
response will certainly ensue, the state may restrict the speech to prevent the
disturbance before it occurs. See, e.g., Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Prin-
cess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968) ("[T]here are special, limited circumstances
in which speech is so interlaced with burgeoning violence that it is not protected
by the broad guarantees of the First Amendment."). See also Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words likely to provoke the average
person to retaliation); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
34. 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
35. Id. at 661. The governor of New Hampshire had threatened to oppose
"the expenditure of one more cent of taxpayers' money for your institutions" if
the university did not act "to rid ... [the] campuses of socially abhorrent ac-
tivities." Id. at 654.
36. Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See also Papish v. Board of
Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam). But cf. Young v. American Mini
114 [Vol. 43
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It also should be noted that failure to obey reasonable and non-dis-
criminatory rules may justify university withdrawal of recognition to
homosexual organizations. 37 This provides university administrators with
an effective check on" the excessive conduct they purport to fear.38 How-
ever, this argument is a weak basis for denying initial recognition because
homosexual organizations easily can deny any intention to break university
regulations.3
9
The Gay Lib decision firmly establishes the constitutional principle that
student homosexual organizations are entitled to recognition by state col-
leges and universities.4 0 Because denial of recognition is a form of prior
restraint on freedom of association, the courts will continue to support
recognition in all but the most extreme cases. Future litigation, therefore,
will focus on the degree to which the activities of homosexual organizations
can be regulated by school administrators once recognition has been
granted.
RICHARD EARL McLEOD
Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), in which the Supreme Court seemed to re-
treat from a hard line "content neutrality" stance and allowed restrictive zoning
of adult movie theaters and similar operations (they were not allowed, for in-
stance, to be established within 1000 feet of each other). Query whether a school
in the situation of the University of Missouri similarly could allow the existence
of the putative social evil, -but restrict its operations to prevent its flourishing.
37. "[R]ecognition, once accorded, may be withdrawn or suspended if
petitioners fail to respect campus law." Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 194 n.24
(1972).
38. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Louisiana St. Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.
1975) (students suspended for organizing boycotts of classes and demonstrations
after being warned of violations of college rules); Tate v. Board of Educ., 453
F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1972) (suspension of students for violation of regulation pro-
hibiting disturbance in assembly); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ.,
363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (rule against wearing of provocative buttons upheld
when accompanied by disruption in school).
39. The statement of purpose of a homosexual group is easily structured to
import no intention contrary to school policies. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558
F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1977); Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d
162, 163 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 654 n.1
(Ist Cir. 1974).
40. Although the holding of the case stands for the clear legal principle
mentioned, the polemic nature of the issues involved indicates that challenges
may be frequent and spirited. On petition for rehearing, the appeals court split
4-4 with a rare and powerful dissenting opinion by the Chief Judge. In addition,
the interest of the Supreme Court is signalled by its order to Gay Lib to file a
reply to the university's petition for certiorari.
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